### PTx

#### No PC- Republicans will push against Obama initiatives for mid-term elections and block him from passing bills.

Spiering 11/7

(Charlie, Commentary Staff Writer at Washington Examiner, The Washington Examiner, “After Bush was re-elected in 2004, Democrats in Congress did not compromise,” November 7, 2012, <http://washingtonexaminer.com/after-bush-was-re-elected-in-2004-democrats-in-congress-did-not-compromise/article/2512871#.UJxNFMXA-xg//wyo-mm>)

Expect Republicans to dig in on their signature issues and block the president as Democrats did. By the time the 2014 mid-terms arrive, expect the party to emerge with a principled – but re-tooled – political narrative for Obama’s second mid-term elections, in which both the Senate map and history will favor them.

#### No PC until midterm elections- empiricism

Baker 10/22

(Ross K., Guampdn, “Radical change unlikely in Congress this year,” October 22, 2012, <http://www.guampdn.com/article/20121022/OPINION02/210220304/Radical-change-unlikely-Congress-year//wyo-mm>)

So you're a farmer upset about the unwillingness of the House to pass an agriculture bill. Or, you're an employee of the U.S. Postal Service who is disappointed with the lack of congressional action on reform. Or you're an IT person concerned about the failure to pass a cybersecurity bill. Well, don't get too hopeful that this November's election is going to produce a dramatically different crop of legislators. Chances are that the changes will be modest. If you're really looking for more radical change, just wait until 2014. If history is any guide, midterm elections -- not the years holding presidential races -- are when big turnovers in the makeup of Congress occur.

### Method

**The criticism is not a reason that traditional approaches to the environment should be abandoned, but rather that state based approaches need to be expanded to include broader scholarship**

**Bryant and Wilson, 1998**

[Raymond and Geoff, Dept. of Geography at King’s College London, “Rethinking environmental management.” Progress in Human Geography 22,3 (1998) pp. 321-343] /Wyo-MB

**Many** other fruitful **interactions** between social science disciplines and subdisciplines could be mentioned (e.g., environmental history, environmental sociology), but these three examples suffice to **illustrate the increasing importance of the social sciences to a reevaluated environmental management**. Thus, and as Figure 1 suggests, environmental management should be a research field largely within the discipline of geography, but which none the less shares an affinity with other social science disciplines and their environmental subdisciplines (cf. Middleton, 1995). **A central goal, therefore, in any effort to re-evaluate environmental management, ought to be to strengthen links to selected disciplines and subdisciplines in such a way as to encourage a more inclusive appreciation of environmental management and environmental managers**. **To revitalize environmental management is also to reassess the definition of this field's scholarly community**. If **environmental management** is to be a more relevant field of study, then it follows that it **ought to reach out to a wider group of scholars** than has hitherto been the case. It is important to emphasize that this question has not even been an issue in most traditional approaches to environmental management ± it was simply understood that the community encompassed only those professional experts linked to the state (e.g., Dorney, 1987; Buckley, 1991; Atchia and Tropp, 1995). Those experts comprised mainly scholars working in the natural sciences and selected `hard' social sciences (e.g., psychology, see Williams, 1987). **A revitalized environmental management must break with this traditionally narrow approach by opening itself to a much more inclusive set of researchers and activists**, not necessarily linked to the state, **and reflecting a wide range of disciplinary influences. The point here is not that `traditional' scholars are no longer relevant to a revitalized environmental management. Rather, it is that the contributions of other researchers hither to excluded from the field need also to be accorded a place in the community**. These researchers may work for various nonstate actors ± environmental NGOs, IFIs, TNCs or grassroots organizations (e.g., people's organizations) ± or work for themselves as independent scholars or consultants. To take but one example, Friends of the Earth routinely commissions critical research on environmental management issues ranging from local-level issues (e.g., highway construction, habitat protection) to global concerns (international mahogany trade). These studies examine the environmental management activities of state agencies, IFIs, businesses, grassroots actors and others and, in doing so, they contribute (at the moment still rather inadvertently!) to the development of the research field (e.g., Friends of the Earth, 1992; 1994). **The adoption of a more inclusive understanding of `scholarly community' in this manner will reinforce over the long term a central message of this article ± namely that, whether understood as a process or as a field of study, environmental management ought not to be the exclusive preserve of state-linked `experts'.**

**Overemphasis on method destroys effectiveness of the discipline**

**Wendt**, Handbook of IR, **2k2** p. 68

It should be stressed that **in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’.** But **the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes** us. But since we do not know how far that is, **if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address**. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

### Calc good

#### We should act to generate the greatest good for the greatest number of people, this comes from the evaluation of specific consequences of an action, rather than its mindset or other issues

S.E.P. 2009

[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2009 Edition, “Consequentialism.” Online, http://www.illc.uva.nl/~seop/archives/spr2009/entries/consequentialism/] /Wyo-MB

The paradigm case of consequentialism is utilitarianism, whose classic proponents were Jeremy Bentham (1789), John Stuart Mill (1861), and Henry Sidgwick (1907). (For predecessors, see Schneewind 1990.) Classic utilitarians held hedonistic act consequentialism. Act consequentialism is the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion. (Cf. Moore 1912, chs. 1-2.) Hedonism then claims that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and that pain is the only intrinsic bad. Together these claims imply that an act is morally right if and only if that act causes "the greatest happiness for the greatest number," as the common slogan says. Classic utilitarianism is consequentialist as opposed to deontological because of what it denies. It denies that moral rightness depends directly on anything other than consequences, such as whether the agent promised in the past to do the act now. Of course, the fact that the agent promised to do the act might indirectly affect the act's consequences if breaking the promise will make other people unhappy. Nonetheless, according to classic utilitarianism, what makes it morally wrong to break the promise is its effects on those other people rather than the fact that the agent promised in the past. Since classic utilitarianism reduces all morally relevant factors (Kagan 1998, 17-22) to consequences, it might appear simple. However, classic utilitarianism is actually a complex combination of many distinct claims, including the following claims about the moral rightness of acts: Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on consequences (as opposed to the circumstances or the intrinsic nature of the act or anything that happens before the act). Actual Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the actual consequences (as opposed to foreseen, foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences). Direct Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act itself (as opposed to the consequences of the agent's motive, of a rule or practice that covers other acts of the same kind, and so on). Evaluative Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the value of the consequences (as opposed to other features of the consequences). Hedonism = the value of the consequences depends only on the pleasures and pains in the consequences (as opposed to other goods, such as freedom, knowledge, life, and so on). Maximizing Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on which consequences are best (as opposed to satisfactory or an improvement over the status quo).

#### Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life

Paul Wapner, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter 2003, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

### BoomBust

#### We solve the link to the disad—we create sustainable sources of financing that don’t dry up and MLPs require competitive business planning, avoiding the problems of picking winners

Bullock 8.10

[Bruce, director of the Maguire Energy Institute SNL Electric Utility Report, “MLP structure for renewables could mobilize capital, lead to consolidation”, p. ln//wyo-tjc]

SNL Energy: What would be the overall benefits to the renewables industry if developers could take advantage of the master limited partnership structure? Bruce Bullock: I think there are a couple of things. One is that it would bring capital into the industry simply because there's a lack of entity-level taxation through MLPs, which essentially means the income is passed through to limited partners or partnership shares and it's taxed at the partner level, and those shares are actually traded on the exchanges. So you have the tax benefits of a partnership, meaning there's no corporate tax, but you have the liquidity benefits of a publicly traded security. It provides renewable energy companies an additional source of capital to go to as some of their other sources have dried up over the past couple of years. That's one benefit. And the second benefit is it does, to a certain extent, rebut the argument of subsidies wherein the government picks winners and losers. If you organize yourself as an MLP, you are subjecting yourself to capital market discipline. You have to have a business plan that shows continual growth in cash flow that you will return to your unit holders or shareholders. Otherwise, you are not going to be able to put those shares on the market and raise the capital. So that kind of sustainable business plan is going to be required to be able to get this benefit, which means the successful, profitable companies will benefit just like they do in the oil and gas sector and the ones that are not successful will not get the benefit, and that, quite frankly, avoids the [Solyndra Inc.] type of arguments.

### Creative destruction

Only through entrepreneurship can business survive

McCraw 7(Thomas K. McCraw, Isidor Stratus Professor of Business History at Harvard Business School, "Prophet of Innovation, pg. 496-497)

**Only through innovation and entrepreneurship can any business** except a government-sponsored monopoly **survive over the long term**. Schumpeter, of course, is the chief proponent and popularizer of the word “entrepreneur,” which appeared in the 1934 English edition of his Theory of Economic Development. (In the original German edition of 1911, he had used the German Unternehmer, which never caught on, partly because its literal meaning is “undertaker.”) Because of the importance of entrepreneurship, and because Schumpeter wrote about it with such insight and verve, his name will be forever linked to the idea. Beginning in the late 1920s Schumpeter made it clear that entrepreneurship could occur within large and medium-sized firms as well as in small ones, despite bureaucratic obstacles. By the mid-twentieth century, he was arguing that **innovation “within the shell of existing corporations offers a much more convenient access to the entrepreneurial functions than existed in the world of owner-managed firms. Many a would-be entrepreneur of today does not found a firm, not because he could not do so but simply because he prefers the other method**.”1 Thus, “new men” founding “new firms” were still vital, but they were no longer the only agents of innovation. The same economic role could be accomplished within older and larger companies. Entrepreneurs were still recognizable personal types, but innovation could also be—and, given the large size of some companies, sometimes had to be—performed by teams of people. Meanwhile, **the continual infusion of energy by the kinds of startup companies Schumpeter himself preferred remained vital sources of economic creativity.** **The history of the information technology industry confirms his thinking especially well—both the scrappy young firms in Silicon Valley § Marked 13:56 § that either perished or remained small-to-medium-sized and others that grew to be giants** (Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Oracle, Cisco Systems, Amazon, Google, Yahoo). **Outside Silicon Valley, the same pattern obviously holds** for Microsoft and Dell Computer, founded by the teenagers Bill Gates in 1975 and Michael Dell in 1984.2